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in evaluation and outcomes, we employ a stochastic life cycle model with endogenous
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programs shape wealth accumulation, ﬁnancial knowledge, and participation in sophisti-
cated assets (e.g. stocks) across heterogeneous consumers. We then apply conventional
program evaluation econometric techniques to simulated data, distinguishing selection
and treatment eﬀects. We show that the more eﬀective programs provide follow-up in
order to sustain the knowledge acquired by employees via the program; in such an in-
stance, ﬁnancial education delivered to employees around the age of 40 can raise savings
at retirement by close to 10%. By contrast, one-time education programs do produce
short-term but few long-term eﬀects. We also measure how accounting for selection af-
fects estimates of program eﬀectiveness on those who participate. Comparisons of par-
ticipants and non participants can be misleading, even using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
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1 Introduction
Employees and their families are increasingly responsible for securing their own ﬁnancial
well-being. Prior to the 1980s, U.S. workers relied mainly on Social Security and employer
sponsored deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension plans for their retirement security. Today, by con-
trast, Baby Boomers are increasingly relying on deﬁned contribution (DC) plans and In-
dividual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) to ﬁnance their golden years. The transition to a
DC retirement saving model has the advantage of permitting more worker ﬂexibility and
labor mobility than in the past, yet it imposes a greater responsibility on individuals to
save, invest, and decumulate their retirement wealth sensibly. At the same time, ﬁnancial
markets have become more complex, oﬀering products that are often diﬃcult to understand.
Whether individualsin particular, older individualsare equipped to deal with this new
ﬁnancial landscape is an important question that has implications for families, society, and
policy makers.
Traditional economic models of saving and consumption decisions implicitly assume that
people are able to formulate and execute saving and decumulation plans, all of which require
expertise in dealing with ﬁnancial markets, and that they have the capacity to undertake
complex economic calculations. Yet, as Lusardi and Mitchell have reported (2008, 2009,
2011a,b), few people possess the ﬁnancial knowledge adequate to make and execute complex
ﬁnancial plans. Moreover, acquiring such knowledge is likely to come at a cost. Previ-
ously we built and calibrated a stochastic life cycle model featuring uncertainty in income,
longevity, capital market returns, and medical expenditures; that study also incorporated an
endogenous knowledge accumulation process and a sophisticated saving technology (Lusardi,
Michaud and Mitchell 2017). In the model, ﬁnancial knowledge provided consumers with
access to sophisticated ﬁnancial products that boosted their expected return on ﬁnancial
assets. Naturally, those seeking to transfer resources over time by saving beneﬁted most
from ﬁnancial knowledge.
The contribution of the present paper is to show how our stochastic life cycle model
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incorporating endogenous human capital acquisition may be used to help evaluate ﬁnancial
literacy programs. Speciﬁcally, since knowledge is at the core of the model, the approach
permits us to evaluate how ﬁnancial education policies can inﬂuence saving and investment
decisions. Several prior studies have sought to measure how ﬁnancial training programs
changes behavior, but few have the kind of experimental data to capture precisely what the
impact of the interventions actually is. Using our model, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
eﬀorts to build workplace ﬁnancial education using econometric methods commonly used
to estimate the eﬀect of such programs. Inasmuch as all counterfactuals are known in the
context of our model, this allows us to compare true outcomes with estimates commonly
generated by conventional program evaluation techniques. We show that it is frequently
optimal for individuals to fail to invest in knowledge, as it is expensive to acquire and will
not beneﬁt everyone. Nevertheless, providing employees with ﬁnancial knowledge can be
valuable, depending on when it is oﬀered and what reinforcement is provided. To this end,
we use conventional program evaluation econometric techniques and simulated data to take
into account selection and treatment eﬀects: this allows us to measure how such programs
shape wealth accumulation, ﬁnancial knowledge, and participation in sophisticated assets
(e.g. stocks) across heterogeneous consumers. Relatively more eﬀective programs are those
which embed follow-up or are continued over time, so as to help employees retain knowledge
acquired via the program. In this case, ﬁnancial education delivered to employees around
the age of 40 will optimally enhance savings at retirement by close to 10%. By contrast,
programs that provide one-time education can generate short-term but few long-term eﬀects.
Finally, we evaluate how important it is to account for selection in program participation. We
conclude that comparing participants and non participants, even in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
framework, can deliver misleading estimates of program eﬀectiveness.
The paper has several parts. First, we brieﬂy summarize prior studies, and next, we de-
scribe our model and outline our calibration approach. We then present a series of scenarios
where we evaluate the simulated impacts of alternative ﬁnancial education programs. In
turn, we use the resulting datasets to examine various econometric models conventionally
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used to evaluate such programs. The paper concludes with a short discussion of the insights
that policy and the ﬁnance and pension industry can gain from this work.
2 Prior Literature
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, interest has burgeoned in
programs seeking to enhance ﬁnancial literacy. For instance, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published a long list of reports on the impor-
tance of ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnancial education programs. Several education programs
in the U.S. focus on educational interventions for young people before they enter the labor
market (Mandell, 2008; Walstad, Rebeck and MacDonald. 2010; Richardson and Seligman,
2014), while others examine programs oﬀered to working-age adults, often by employers who
seek to enhance employees' appreciation of and investment in their workplace-based ﬁnancial
literacy education (e.g., Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Clark, d'Ambrosio, McDermed, and
Sawant 2006; Lusardi, Keller, and Keller, 2008; Clark, Morrill, and Allen 2012).
Despite the widespread popularity of such programs in the U.S. and elsewhere, our
recent literature review (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) as well as Collins and O'Rourke (2010)
argued that relatively little could be learned from most of the existing evaluations to date.
This is because analysts have typically not followed the protocol required by 'gold standard'
randomized controlled trials, enabling researchers to extrapolate from observed results. More
speciﬁcally, a good evaluation will compare outcomes for a randomly selected `treatment'
versus 'control' group, where the former will be exposed to a well-deﬁned ﬁnancial literacy
program, while the latter will not (Imbens and Woolridge, 2009; Imbens, 2010). To this
end, the modern program evaluation literature has identiﬁed three commonly used metrics
for such comparisons: an Intent to Treat (ITT) measure, an Average Treatment Eﬀect
on the Treated (ATET) measure, and a Local Average Treatment (LATE) measure. In our
context, the ITT compares outcomes of those who were versus were not oﬀered the program,
irrespective of whether and which people actually elected the program when oﬀered. The
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ATET measures the eﬀect for the treated, not the average eﬀect of moving someone into
treatment, and hence it is often the only way to estimate program eﬀects when selection
is present; that is, one may not be able to evaluate a program's average treatment eﬀect
when those who do participate endogenously diﬀer from those who do not.1 Finally, the
LATE measure, as deﬁned by Angrist and Imbens (1994), captures the eﬀect of the program
for those who would participate in the program only if it was oﬀered. .2Randomization of
eligibility is a key ingredient for the recovery of LATE by instrumental variables regression.
In the context of ﬁnancial education programs, some authors seeking to evaluate the
impact of the programs have estimated ITT eﬀects by comparing outcomes for people who
were and were not exposed to the programs, given the option to undertake education pro-
grams. Good examples include studies of programs mandating high school ﬁnancial literacy
programs at diﬀerent times across states (c.f., Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki 2001; Bayer,
Bernheim and Sholz 2009). Yet other researchers have estimated the eﬀect of participating
in a program which may include both treatment and selection eﬀects; numerous examples
are cited in Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). And ﬁnally, several researchers have sought to
estimate program eﬀectiveness using instrumental variables estimation, seeking to control
on potential unobserved factors driving program participation and thus recover the LATE
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Our general conclusion, however, is that much remains to
be learned about how ﬁnancial education aﬀects key outcomes of interest. Without a well-
deﬁned control group selected via randomized assignment, it is typically diﬃcult to measure
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial education programs, since assumptions needed to estimate what pro-
gram adopters would have done in the absence of the program (the counterfactual) are
probably too strong.
To remedy this problem, we show below how we can use our model (LMM forthcoming)
to help clarify what can happen when a ﬁnancial education program evaluation lacks a
guiding theoretical framework. Most importantly, given individual heterogeneity and the
1In some cases, however, if a proper counterfactual can be identiﬁed, the average treatment eﬀect can be
estimated.
2In a randomized control trial with one-sided non-compliance (individuals not assigned to treatment
cannot receive it), the LATE estimate may coincide with the ATET eﬀect.
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costs and beneﬁts of ﬁnancial literacy, not everyone will gain from ﬁnancial education.
Accordingly, one should not expect a 100% participation rate in every ﬁnancial education
program. Moreover, according to our model, ﬁnancial education programs may not always
boost savings, and in fact they may not increase savings at all for some. Therefore it
is inaccurate to conclude that lack of saving means that ﬁnancial education is ineﬀective.
Instead, lack of saving can actually be optimal behavior for some, and ﬁnancial education
would not be expected to change that behavior. In this respect, our framework helps explain
who is likely to participate in such programs, what behavioral outcomes can result, and
whether lack of impact is proof of program ineﬀectiveness.
3 The Model and Calibration
3.1 Model
In what follows, we focus on workplace ﬁnancial education programs of the sort most often
oﬀered by employers with deﬁned contribution pensions.3 We consider employees who can
elect to take advantage of such programs, which for the present purposes can be concep-
tualized as ﬁnancial education of one year's duration, delivered to employees who have not
previously anticipated getting the oﬀer.
We characterize each program in terms of three key parameters: an eligibility rule, a
program cost, and the program's eﬀectiveness. We assume eligibility is assigned randomly
to all employees of a given age, which we vary across experimental settings (more on this
below). The impact of the ﬁnancial education program is to reduce the employee's cost
of investing in knowledge. When a program is of high quality, it provides an incentive to
acquire more knowledge, and individual employees will then decide whether to participate
in the program. Costs matter as well: for instance, if the program were free, all workers
will participate (or at best they will be indiﬀerent). In order to capture the time/money
costs of participating in the program, we model the participation cost for the program as a
3See for instance, Bernheim and Garrett (2003); Bayer, Bernheim, and Sholz (2009); Clark, d'Ambrosio,
McDermed, and Sawant (2006), and Clark, Morrill, and Allen (2014).
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ﬁxed variable; a more general framework could depend on income or education, but for the
present purposes we keep it ﬁxed.
The remainder of the model follows our prior work (LMM forthcoming). Each individual
is posited to select his consumption stream by maximizing expected discounted utility, where
utility ﬂows are discounted by . Utility is assumed to be strictly concave in consumption
and deﬁned as ntu(ct=nt), where nt is an equivalence scale capturing (known) diﬀerences
in consumption patterns across demographic groups (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun,
hereafter SSK 2006). Each person's faces a stochastic mortality risk (in addition to income
and medical expenditure risk), and decisions are made from time t=0 (age 25) to age T (or as
long as the individual is still alive; T=100 ). We examine people of three diﬀerent education
proﬁles (High School dropouts or <HS; High school graduates or HS; and those with at
least some college, whom we call the College+). It is important to allow for heterogeneity
in earnings because diﬀerent groups receive diﬀerent rewards from the progressive social
insurance system, as described in LMM (forthcoming), and they face diﬀerential patterns of
income, mortality, demographics, and out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk.
We also posit that the individual can invest his resources using two diﬀerent investment
technologies. One is a basic technology (for example, a checking account) which yields
a certain (low) return r (R = 1 + r). This represents the expected return to consumers
without any ﬁnancial know-how. The other is a more sophisticated technology which enables
the consumer to receive a higher expected return which increases in ﬁnancial knowledge f
but comes at a cost. Speciﬁcally, the consumer must pay a direct cost (fee) to use the
technology, cd, and he must also invest time and money in acquiring the knowledge to
generate a suﬃciently high excess return. Obtaining knowledge in the form of investment it
thus has a cost of i(it); we assume that this cost function is convex, reﬂecting decreasing
returns in the production of knowledge. We remain agnostic about whether the average
cost of investing in additional knowledge is higher or lower for more educated households;
rather, we assume initially that all households face the same cost function. The rate of
return to the sophisticated technology is stochastic, with an expected return that depends
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on the individual's level of ﬁnancial knowledge at the end of t, eR(ft+1). Thus the stochastic
return function is log-normally distributed with log eR(ft+1) = r + r(ft) + ﬀ""t where ﬀ" is
the standard deviation of a normally distributed shock "t. The function r(ft+1) is increasing
in ft+1 and it can be interpreted as an excess return function. Since the variance is assumed
ﬁxed, this also implies that individuals with higher ﬁnancial knowledge obtain a higher
Sharpe ratio (higher risk-adjusted returns) on their investments. We denote by t the
fraction of wealth that the consumer invests in the sophisticated technology in period t.
Financial knowledge evolves according to the following equation:
ft+1 = (1  )ft + it
where  is a depreciation rate and it is gross investment. Depreciation exists both because
consumer ﬁnancial knowledge may decay, and also because some knowledge may become
obsolete as new ﬁnancial products are developed. Alternatively, ﬁnancial education can be
modeled as a permanent boost to knowledge if the depreciation rate were to become smaller
or even zero.
The consumer is also eligible for a government transfer trt which guarantees a minimum
consumption ﬂoor of cmin (as in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, hereafter HSZ; 1995). This
consumption ﬂoor can lower the expected variance of future consumption, which diminishes
the precautionary motive for saving. Transfers are deﬁned as trt = max(cmin   xt; 0) where
cash on hand is:
xt = at + yt   oopt
where yt is net household income and oopt represents out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Both variables are stochastic over and above a deterministic trend. The sophisticated tech-
nology cannot be purchased if xt  cd < cmin (that is, the government will not pay for costs
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of obtaining the technology). End-of-period assets are given by:
at+1 = eR(ft+1)(xt + trt   ct   (it)  cdI(t > 0))
where eR(ft+1) = (1   t)R + t eR(ft). We impose a borrowing constraint on the model
such that assets at+1 must be non-negative.
Following the literature, the individual's net income (in logs) during his worklife is given
by a deterministic component which depends on education, age, and an AR(1) stochastic
process; retirement occurs at age 65. After retirement, the individual receives retirement
income which is a function of pre-retirement income and a similar stochastic AR(1) process
is assumed for post-retirement out-of-pocket medical expenditures.4. Finally, we allow for
mortality risk at all ages, denoting pe;t as the one-year survival probability. Mortality risk
is allowed to diﬀer across education groups, as in LMM (forthcoming).
The state-space in period t is deﬁned as st = (y;t; o;t; e; ft; at) where y;t and o;t are
shocks to income and medical spending. The consumer's decisions are given by (ct; it; t).
Accordingly, there are three continuous control variables, consumption, investment, and the
share of investment in the technology, and a discrete one, participation. There are ﬁve state
variables. We represent the problem as a series of Bellman equations such that, at each age,
the value function has the following form:
V (st) = max
ct;it;t
ne;tu(ct=ne;t) + pe;t

"

y

o
V (st+1)dFe(o)dFe(y)dF (")
at+1 = eR(ft+1)(at + ye;t + trt   ct   (it)  cdI(t > 0)); at+1  0
ft+1 = (1  )ft + it
eR(ft+1) = (1  t)R+ t eR(ft):
We index variables by e where education diﬀerences are assumed to be present. The model
4Because these expenditures are generally low prior to retirement (and to save on computation time), we
allow only for medical expenditure risk after retirement (as in HSZ 1995)
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is solved by backward recursion after discretizing the continuous state variables.5
3.2 Calibration
To explore the impact of ﬁnancial education on employee behavior, we assume that u(ct=nt)
has a CRRA form with relative risk aversion ﬀ for calibration purposes. Here we assume
ﬀ = 1:6, close to the value estimated by Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999) using
consumption data. Following SSK (2006), we deﬁne an equivalence scale that accounts for
consumption diﬀerences in household size by education group and changes in demographics
over the life cycle. Assuming that z(j; k) = (j + 0:7k)0:75 where j is the number of adults
in the household and k is the number of children under age 18, we then deﬁne ne;t =
z(je;t; ke;t)=z(2; 1) where je;t and ke;t are the average number of adults and children in the
household by age and education group. We use data from the PSID to estimate the time
series of average equivalence scales by education group. The age proﬁle of those scales is
hump-shaped and more ampliﬁed for less-educated households. For the base case, we use
a discount factor of 0.96 (as in SSK, 2006, and Campbell and Viceira 2002). The annual
minimum consumption ﬂoor is set at $10,000 for a couple with one child.
Post-retirement income is deﬁned to be a function of pre-retirement income, estimated
from ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions analyzed separately by education level of net household income
on age and a retirement dummy, as in LMM (forthcoming). This produces replacement rates
of 0.75 for high school dropouts, 0.74 for high school graduates, and 0.63 for the College+,
close to those based on total retirement income in the literature (e.g. Aon Consulting, 2008).
Following retirement, we let income decline at the rate estimated in PSID data controlling
for educational groups and cohort eﬀects; that pattern is mostly due to changes in household
composition (e.g. widowhood).
Turning to the ﬁnancial market variables, we posit a safe asset return of r =2% (as
in Campbell and Viceira 2002). As the excess return function has not been previously
established, we note that the range of risk-adjusted excess portfolio returns reported by von
5For additional details on the solution method see LMM (forthcoming).
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Gaudecker (2011), for example, is -0.017 (5th percentile) to 0.054 (95th percentile). Using
Euler equations, Jappelli and Padula (2013) estimate that each point of ﬁnancial literacy is
associated with an expected increase in the return to saving from 0.2 to 1 percent. Clark,
Lusardi and Mitchell (forthcoming) use administrative data on 401(k) participants and ﬁnd
that there is about a one percentage point diﬀerence in returns between those who have the
lowest ﬁnancial literacy score and those that have the highest. We therefore use a linear
function by setting rmax = r(fmax) = 0:04 and rmin = r(fmin) = 0 where 0.04 is chosen to
match the equity premium used in the portfolio literature. Below, we choose a convex cost
function for investing in ﬁnancial knowledge, which therefore embodies decreasing returns to
producing knowledge. We set ﬀ" = 0:16 in the simulations (Campbell and Viceira, 2002).
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Estimating the price of acquiring ﬁnancial knowledge is diﬃcult, as little is known re-
garding inputs to the production process (time and expenditures on ﬁnancial services), along
with investments in, as opposed to, the stock of ﬁnancial knowledge. As in LMM (forthcom-
ing), we model the process using the function (it) = 50i
1:75
t , a form that posits that the
ﬁrst units of knowledge are inexpensive, while marginal costs rise thereafter. To parametrize
the participation cost for the sophisticated technology (cd), we use the median estimate of
$750 (in $2004), following Vissing-Jorgensen (2003). We also require an estimate of the
depreciation factor for ﬁnancial knowledge, , though little is known on the size of this pa-
rameter. We use a value of 6 percent in our baseline calibration which is consistent with
estimates of the depreciation of human capital.
Given this calibration, we can ﬁnd optimal consumption, ﬁnancial knowledge investment,
and technology participation at each point in the state-space and at each age. Having done
so, we then use our decision rules to simulate 2,500 individuals moving through their life
cycles. We draw income, out-of-pocket medical expenditure, and rate of return shocks, and
we use these to simulate the life cycle paths of all consumers. These consumers are given the
initial conditions for education, earnings, and assets derived from the PSID for individuals
age 25-30. We initialize ﬁnancial knowledge at the lowest level (0). A list of the baseline
6For information on how we estimate income and medical expenditure processes as well as mortality risk
by education, see LMM (forthcoming).
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parameters and their values is provided in the Appendix.
4 Simulating the Impact of Financial Education Programs
4.1 The Programs
Given the model described above and the parameters of interest, we can evaluate the im-
pact of employer-provided ﬁnancial education programs on a variety of outcomes, including
whether and which employees elect to participate, how much they invest in ﬁnancial knowl-
edge, their use of the sophisticated technology to invest, and how their lifetime consumption
and utility levels change. We let eligibility for a particular ﬁnancial education program of-
fered in a given year be expressed using a binary variable dit, and in what follows we assume
eligibility is assigned randomly to all employees of that given age (which we vary across ex-
perimental settings). We model the ﬁnancial education program as reducing the employee's
cost of investing in knowledge. We expressed p(it) = #(it) , where # < 1 captures the
eﬃciency of the program. If the program is high quality, it provides an incentive to acquire
more knowledge and more employees will then decide to participate in the program. Costs
matter as well. For instance, if the program were free, all workers will participate (or be
indiﬀerent). In order to capture the ﬁxed time and perhaps money costs of participating in
the program, we deﬁne  as the participation cost for the program.
If the employee is eligible for a program, we deﬁne Vp(st) (p = 0; 1) as the value (indirect
utility) of not participating versus participating, respectively. The individual participates
if v(st) = V1(st)   V0(st) is greater than zero. We add a zero mean disturbance to this
diﬀerence, it  N(0; ﬀv). Hence, participation is given by:
pit = I(v(st) + it > 0)
In order for it to have the correct scale, we ﬁx ﬀv to the standard deviation of the simulated
utility diﬀerences (0.001).
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The simulations to follow explore a number of diﬀerent programs. First, program eli-
gibility is a function of age, so we evaluate how results change depending on whether the
program is provided to employees at age 30, 40, or 50. When a worker is of the targeted
age, he is deemed to be eligible with probability 0.5. We also explore how program eﬀec-
tiveness aﬀects outcomes, by varying # 2 [0:1; 0:5]. Additionally, we vary the ﬁxed cost of
participating (i.e.,  2 [250; 500]). And in a ﬁnal and very important case, we also allow for
the program to aﬀect knowledge depreciation. That is, we posit that the ﬁnancial education
program provides knowledge that does not depreciate over time. This last experiment cap-
tures the possibility that a program could provide employees with ﬁnancial advisers who can
be accessed over time or that the program is continued over time. A total of six illustrative
scenarios is considered below.
4.2 Who Participates in Financial Education Programs?
To understand who participates and who does not in a workplace ﬁnancial education program
of the sort described here, we ﬁrst explore employees' participation patterns across various
scenarios. Table 1 reports how participation rates in the program vary given (randomly
assigned) employee eligibility, where it is clear that participation rates overall (last column)
are generally below 100 percent. We emphasize that this is not a sign of program failure;
rather, people must incur a cost when investing in knowledge, and knowledge depreciates
with time. For both reasons, not everyone will partake of the opportunity to build knowledge.
It is also worth noting that program participation rates rise depending when (at which age)
program is oﬀered. This is to be expected, since people tend to save most between the ages
of 40 and 60; employees have little money to manage earlier in life. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that program participation is higher for the better-educated, due to the larger gain from
investing in knowledge for those individuals. Conversely, the least-educated are less likely
to partake of the program oﬀering. As we showed in LMM (forthcoming), the uneducated
optimally save less, both as a result of their greater reliance on the social safety net, and their
shorter life expectancies. The ﬁnal two rows of the table indicate how participation rates
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for a program oﬀered at a given age, say age 40, vary depending on two factors: program
eﬃciency, and the cost of participation. Logically enough, more eﬃcient programs attract
higher participation, whereas higher costs reduce participation.
[Insert Table 1]
In Table 2, we summarize the baseline characteristics of those who elect to participate in
a ﬁnancial education program when oﬀered, versus those who do not (conditional on being
eligible at a given age). Results indicate that program participants have higher earnings,
more initial knowledge, and more wealth, while nonparticipants are poorer, earn less, and
have little ﬁnancial knowledge at baseline. This selectiveness occurs regardless of the age
at which the program is oﬀered. Importantly, it implies that an average program eﬀective-
ness measure which assumes that program and nonparticipants could beneﬁt as much as
participants will likely be biased.
[Insert Table 2]
The fact that those who optimally elect to undertake the ﬁnancial education program
diﬀer systematically from those who do not underscores the fact that a careful program
evaluation must take into account the process by which people endogenously elect into the
program. That is, it would be misleading to compare outcomes for program participants
versus nonparticipants, since each group has diﬀerent reasons for their behavior. Moreover,
any evaluation program that cannot carefully control the sample's baseline characteristics
will be subject to such selection bias. Of course some of these characteristics  e.g., ﬁnancial
knowledge  may be diﬃcult to measure precisely. Nevertheless, unless randomization is
available, modeling the selection process is critical.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Financial Education Programs over the Life Cycle
A useful aspect of our simulation approach is that the same simulated respondents are
observed in diﬀerent experimental settings, as they are, in turn, oﬀered diﬀerent ﬁnancial
education programs. Accordingly, we may compare life cycle investment, wealth, and saving
proﬁles for the same individuals, along with information about whether they did or did not
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optimally take part in each program.
Figures 1 to 6 report results, under six diﬀerent ﬁnancial education settings, of average
proﬁles of investment in knowledge, stock of knowledge, changes in wealth (in percent), and
the share of wealth invested in the sophisticated technology. Speciﬁcally, ﬁgures 1-3 analyze
how results change when the program is oﬀered to a worker at age 30, 40, or 50. Figure 4
reports results for a program oﬀered to a 40-year old employee with an enhanced eﬃciency
parameter, and in Figure 5 we lower the ﬁxed cost of knowledge (shown in the same order
as in Tables 1 and 2). Figure 6 illustrates how results change when ﬁnancial knowledge
depreciation is shut down, as for instance when an employer may maintain the employee's
ﬁnancial sophistication post-program via continued monitoring.
[Insert Figures 1 to 6]
A comparison of the ﬁrst three Figures shows how results change when we vary the age
at which the program is implemented. In each case, the upper left-hand panel depicts the
impact on investment in ﬁnancial knowledge, while the impact of the program on the stock
of ﬁnancial knowledge appears in the upper right-hand panel. In the lower left, we report
the percentage change in wealth, and on the lower right, the share of the population using
the sophisticated investment technology. Each panel includes three lines: the solid line refers
to non-enrolled but eligible participants; the dashed line refers to enrolled participants; and
the dotted line indicates how participants would have behaved without the program being
introduced  a true counterfactual for those who did enroll when they could.
Figure 1 shows what happens with the program is made available to age 30 employees.
Those who participate in the program do invest substantially in ﬁnancial knowledge; this
translates into a higher stock of ﬁnancial knowledge compared to their own (no-program)
counterfactual. We also see that those who participate in the program cut back on their
investment after the program expires. Along with depreciation in ﬁnancial knowledge, this
leads to a dampening of the program's eﬀect when it is over. Nevertheless, after the initial
ramp-up in ﬁnancial knowledge, the marginal eﬀect on behavior compared to the proper
counterfactual is quite small. Conversely, we see that those who do invest in the ﬁnancial
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knowledge program are markedly diﬀerent from those who do not. In other words, both
ﬁnancial knowledge and sophisticated investment proﬁles are much higher compared to em-
ployees who optimally elect not to participate, underscoring the sample selection concern
made earlier. In fact, if one were to compare program participants and nonparticipants,
one would (erroneously) conclude that the program had an enormous impact on the stock
of ﬁnancial knowledge, producing a 20 percentage point advantage for participants. Yet
the true counterfactual shows that the net eﬀect of a one-year program oﬀered at age 30 is
quite small, particularly by the time the worker attains age 65. Results are similar across
Figures 1-3, though when the program is implemented on older versus younger workers, the
consequences appear slightly larger.
Somewhat larger program eﬀects are evident in Figures 4 and 5. When the program
oﬀered becomes more eﬃcacious for a 40-year old employee (Figures 2 versus 4), the employee
experiences a much larger bump-up in knowledge which persists for some time, and savings
rise detectably. Similar results obtain when the cost of knowledge is reduced (Figure 2 versus
5). Here again, investment in knowledge rises and some persistence in higher savings can be
detected.
A much larger and longer-term impact results from shutting down the knowledge depre-
ciation parameter, conﬁrmed by a comparison of Figures 2 and 6. The 40-year old employee
oﬀered access to a ﬁnancial education program whose eﬀects do not decay will average three
times more investment in knowledge, which in turn boosts his saving substantially. This
eﬀect persists until retirement, underscoring the long-term eﬀect of not only building the
knowledge, but also extending it throughout time. In other words, a one-time ﬁnancial ed-
ucation program may have title eﬀect, as expected, but the long term eﬀects of a persistent
ﬁnancial education program can be sizable.
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5 Evaluating Financial Education Programs
Next we use our simulated data to investigate the eﬀect of the programs of interest using
the diﬀerent metrics employed in the ﬁnancial education literature, as described above. We
also evaluate program eﬀectiveness on welfare, measured by changes in lifetime consumption
and utility.
5.1 Long-Term Eﬀects
Frequently, empirical researchers may not know when individuals in any given survey may
have been exposed to or oﬀered some sort of programs. In the present case, for instance, an
employee may not recall whether his employer ever oﬀered a ﬁnancial education program and
if so, when. Nevertheless, in some cases the econometrician may be able to observe wealth at
some particular age (e.g., retirement), accompanied with an indicator of whether the person
had ever been exposed to such a program earlier in life.7 This can allow a determination of
how oﬀering an educational program aﬀects outcomes of interest. In other cases, one might
know which employees elected to take a program, permitting a comparison of outcomes
between those who participated and those who did not. Rarely are both available, in practice,
and the diﬀerent outcomes are not directly comparable unless, as shown above, strong
assumptions hold about the selection process into the program.
Results in Table 3 illustrate how results diﬀer in our simulated setting where we can
measure each of the key employee subgroups. For the six scenarios described earlier, we
present four columns of retirement wealth values. The ﬁrst column summarizes wealth
levels for participants who elected to take the program when oﬀered. The second column
reports counterfactual wealth for the same people if the program had never been oﬀered.
The third column shows wealth levels for nonparticipants  those oﬀered but who declined
to participate  and the ﬁnal column summarizes average wealth for those never oﬀered
the program. As before, each row represents a diﬀerent policy experiment, with a program
7For instance the Health and Retirement Study has asked older individuals if their employers had oﬀered
them workplace-based ﬁnancial education programs (Lusardi, 2004).
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oﬀered at age 30, 40, or 50 (ﬁrst three rows), or at age 40 and three sets of other parameters
comparable with those developed in Figures 1-5.
[Insert Table 3]
Turning to the ﬁrst row of that Table, program participants held mean wealth at retire-
ment of $524,271. Had they not participated in the program, the same people's mean wealth
would have been about 1% lower (and the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant). This is
the properly measured program eﬀect on those who participated, consistent with Figure 1.
In other words, the program did boost both ﬁnancial knowledge and wealth at the time the
employees were oﬀered the program, but by retirement, the eﬀect virtually disappeared.
In the real world, of course, we typically cannot observe the ideal counterfactual; instead,
we must ﬁnd ways to identify a counterfactual and therefore the average eﬀect of the program
on the treated. If one could reasonably assume that program participation were independent
of wealth, then nonparticipants could be used to measure the counterfactual: the estimated
program eﬀect would be to raise retirement wealth by 75% ($225,292/$298,979).
These numbers would lead one to conclude that the program was extremely eﬀective in
boosting saving; however, as demonstrated earlier, this is a severely upward-biased metric
because participation is correlated with wealth at baseline. Alternatively, we could inves-
tigate the eﬀect of oﬀering the program without conditioning on those who participated.
Since program eligibility is random in our simulation, everyone who was eligible to elect the
program comprises the ITT group. From Table 1, we know that 36% of those oﬀered the
program participated, which when combined with data in Table 3, yields an average wealth
level of $381,480 for the eligible, versus $392,069 among the ineligible. Surprisingly, then,
by this metric, oﬀering the program decreases average retirement wealth by a statistically
insigniﬁcant3% (-$10,589/$381,480).
We can do better by recalling that program eligibility is random in our scenarios. Ac-
cordingly, we can recover the eﬀect of the program on participants by comparing program
participants and non participants. To do so, Imbens and Angris (1994) suggest using the
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Wald estimator:
 =
E[wi;65jdi = 1]  E[wi;65jdi = 0]
E[pijdi = 1]  E[pijdi = 0]
where wi;65 is wealth of respondent i at age 65, di denotes eligibility, and pi participation.
The expectation operator is E[] . Under certain assumptions, Imbens and Angrist (1994)
show that this Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) eﬀectively captures the eﬀect for
a group of individuals who comply with the treatment being oﬀered. Since the ineligible
cannot participate, E[pijdi = 0] = 0, we have one-sided non-compliance and therefore the
eﬀect becomes:
 =
E[wi;65jdi = 1]  E[wi;65jdi = 0]
E[pijdi = 1]
:
This delivers the average eﬀect of the program on the treated, or the ATET (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). For the ﬁrst scenario in Table 3, this yields a statistically insigniﬁcant change
(-$10,589/0.36 = -$29,414), or a 7.4% drop, in percentage terms.
Continuing down the rows in Table 3, it is interesting to note that the largest bias
generated by comparing participants and nonparticipants occurs when the program is oﬀered
to employees at age 40. At earlier ages, selection is less strong since participants and
nonparticipants are more similar and wealth is lower. Later in life, however, the saving
motive switches from precautionary to retirement preparation, and behavioral diﬀerences are
exacerbated. After age 50, these diﬀerences again diminish. Since most ﬁnancial education
in the workplace occurs mid-career (around the age of 40), our model suggest that selection
can be a major threat to the evaluation of such programs.
It is also of interest that the largest eﬀects occur for most eﬃcient programs provided at
low cost. For example, the next to ﬁnal row in Table 3 (where # = 0:25; and = 250) shows
that the true program eﬀect slightly boosts retirement wealth by 1.3% ($6,491/ $472381
which is statistically insigniﬁcant). Comparing the ineligible with the eligible groups, we
see an apparent negative impact of oﬀering the program (by 3.1%, or -$12,361/395314).
The Wald estimator of the eﬀect for those who comply with the oﬀer of the program yields
an estimated 4.9 % eﬀect of (-$19684/ $395314 and not statistically signiﬁcant). In fact,
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the only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect across all program scenarios evaluated is found in the
ﬁnal row of Table 3, where depreciation has been shut down. This program does increase
retirement wealth substantially, by 9% (($467371 - $428874)/$428874), yet that is much
smaller than the 1.5 times wealth increment that would result from (incorrectly) using the
nonparticipant pool as the comparator group.
To reﬁne these estimates, next we implement these identiﬁcation strategies in a regression
framework which allows us to control for observable diﬀerences in outcomes.
5.1.1 Intent-to-Treat
As noted above, the intent-to-treat measure in our setting compares outcomes of those who
were program-eligible to those who were not, assuming that program eligibility is exogenous
to outcomes. To test this with our simulated data, we implement the following regression
which controls for education and average lifetime income:
logwi;65 = xi +4di + i:
Under random assignment, we have i?di.
Table 4 reports for each of our six scenarios the point estimate of 4 along with its
standard error. In ﬁve of the six cases, the program eﬀects are small and statistically
insigniﬁcant, ranging from -0.06 to 0.1236. This conﬁrms the unconditional levels estimates
we reported in Table 3. By contrast, the program eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
for the ﬁnal experiment, where ﬁnancial knowledge is preserved through time. The estimate
suggest an eﬀect of 30% with a standard error of 12%. Controlling for covariates yields an
even larger ITT estimate.
[Insert Table 4]
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5.1.2 OLS on Program Participation
Thus far, we have argued that, due to selection bias, comparisons of participants and non-
participants do not identify the eﬀect of the program on outcomes. But one might wonder
whether this could be remedied by controlling for factors observed sometimes early in life,
say at age 25. Since ﬁnancial knowledge is zero at age 25, there are two exogenous outcomes
on which we could condition: wealth at age 25, and average lifetime income (in addition to
the education dummies). To evaluate this, we run the following OLS regression:
logwi;65 = xi +4pi + i
This delivers the average eﬀect of the program on the treated, if i?pijxi. Table 5 reports
the new point estimates of 4 along with their standard errors.
Results in Table 5 show that when a ﬁnancial education program is oﬀered early in
life, such as at age 30, baseline controls can suﬃciently correct for selection, since estimated
eﬀects are close to zero. After that, however, the controls and functional form are insuﬃcient
to control for biases imparted by endogenous selection. In other words, the estimated eﬀect
of participating in the program becomes large and statistically signiﬁcant when the program
is oﬀered to older workers. This is mainly due to the fact that incentives to save and, thus,
acquire knowledge are a function of the income, rather than simply its level.
[Insert Table 5]
5.1.3 Local Average Treatment Eﬀects
The Wald estimator can also be implemented as an instrumental variables (IV) regression
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In our case, the ﬁrst-stage regression for participation is:
pi = xi+ di + i
assuming that eligibility is independent of i. Results are reported in Table 6 along with
standard errors. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that programs which do not aﬀect depreciation have
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little eﬀect on retirement-age wealth levels. Although the point estimates are generally pos-
itive, the standard errors are often large. Only in the ﬁnal scenario where the average eﬀect
on the treated (true) is positive does the LATE estimator pick up the eﬀect and does the
estimate become statistically signiﬁcant. Accordingly, this IV estimator is a proper estima-
tor of the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET) when eligibility or assignment to
treatment is random.
[Insert Table 6]
5.2 Contemporaneous Eﬀects
Several evaluations of ﬁnancial education programs compare the same individuals prior to
and after receiving the training. When the same is done for a control group, one can
implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DD) strategy of the following form:
logwit = i + t +4zit + xit+ it
for zit = (pit; dit). Identiﬁcation of the average eﬀect requires that it?zitjxit; t; i. The
common-trend assumption imposes that, in the absence of the program, the average change
in wealth of those who participate (zit = 1) would have been the same as for those not
participating (zit = 0): We can estimate this equation using ﬁxed-eﬀect regression using
either pit or dit. As described above, estimates of 4 capture both the ATET and the ITT
eﬀects.
To implement this approach in our simulated data, we consider two periods: one year
prior to the program, and ﬁve years after the program. Since we can directly compute the
average eﬀect of the program on those who participated (using the true counterfactual),
we also report this estimate in column 4 of Table 7. We ﬁnd that the true eﬀect of the
program on those who participate is generally small, except when the program is highly
eﬀective. Using non participants as the counterfactual (hence implementing DD with pit)
yields generally large and positive eﬀects. The key explanation for why these estimates are
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biased is that the common-trend assumption in fact does not hold for participants and non
participants. That is, participants in ﬁnancial education programs in our scenario would
save more in the absence of the programs, compared to non participants. For this reason,
using the trend on wealth of nonparticipants as a counterfactual grossly overestimates the
eﬀect of the programs. Implementing DD with eligibility yields relatively smaller biases,
compared to using participation.
[Insert Table 7]
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In previous research we have demonstrated that important segments of the population are
ﬁnancially unsophisticated and do not understand simple interest, inﬂation, and risk di-
versiﬁcation (Lusardi and Mitchell 2008, 2011a,b). We have also shown that it is actually
optimal for many people to be unsophisticated, in that some people will rationally elect not
to invest in knowledge as it is expensive to acquire and does not beneﬁt everyone (LMM
forthcoming). The present paper goes farther by using our theoretical model to evaluate the
impacts of well-speciﬁed ﬁnancial education programs that could be oﬀered by employers to
workers of diﬀerent ages. In particular, we use our stochastic life cycle model incorporat-
ing endogenous knowledge accumulation to evaluate six diﬀerent ﬁnancial literacy program
scenarios. This is useful since no empirical studies have the kind of information needed to
capture precisely what the impact of the interventions will be. In our case, we know all
relevant counterfactuals to compare true outcomes with program eﬀectiveness estimates
generated by conventional econometric techniques.
Our approach provides several important insights regarding ﬁnancial education program
evaluation. First, we show that low participation rates in such programs can be rational,
once we recognize that improving ﬁnancial literacy does not beneﬁt everyone and acquiring
knowledge is costly. In particular, the low-income and less-educated have less to gain from
participating in such programs. For this reason, it is incorrect to conclude that ﬁnancial
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education programs are not valued and preach only to the converted. Rather, the decision
to invest in ﬁnancial education depends on its costs and beneﬁts, factors which diﬀer across
individuals. Second, our model emphasizes the role of self-selection in ﬁnancial education,
particularly at older ages. Accordingly, great care is required to rigorously evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial education in non-experimental settings, where self-selection tends
to occur. Third, prior studies have taken too narrow a focus by overlooking the crucial role
of knowledge retention, once the ﬁnancial education is obtained. That is, ﬁnancial education
delivered to employees around the age of 40 can raise savings at retirement by close to 10%,
if the knowledge gained can be maintained. Fourth, and relatedly, we show that short-
term ﬁnancial education programs are unlikely to dramatically alter saving, especially when
oﬀered to young people. They are more eﬀective when targeted at peak saving years (e.g.,
post-age 40).
A ﬁnal important lesson from our work is to point out how measures of ﬁnancial education
program eﬀectiveness shape outcomes across heterogeneous individuals so that evaluators
build several key elements into the study design. First, it is essential to have accurate
measures are of what information the program delivers and what sort of follow-up is pro-
vided. Second, the researcher must measure baseline features of the eligible sample including
wealth, income, and ﬁnancial literacy. Third, it is necessary to randomize eligibility for the
treatment. And fourth, longer-term follow-up is crucial.
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: Inter-
vention at age 30 with # = 0:5 and  = 500.We plot the average age proﬁle of investment in
knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
28
2
4
6
8
10
12
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
20
40
60
80
st
oc
k 
of
 fi
na
nc
ia
l k
no
wl
ed
ge
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
ch
an
g 
in
 w
ea
lth
 (p
erc
en
t)
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
sh
ar
e 
so
ph
ist
ica
te
d
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
intervention at age 40, program cost of 500, relative marginal cost is .5
not enrolled enrolled enrolled − counterfactual
Figure 2: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Programs over the Life-Cycle: Inter-
vention at age 40 with # = 0:5 and  = 500.We plot the average age proﬁle of investment in
knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Programs over the Life-Cycle: Inter-
vention at age 50 with # = 0:5 and  = 500.We plot the average age proﬁle of investment in
knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Programs over the Life-Cycle: Inter-
vention at age 40 with # = 0:25 and  = 500.We plot the average age proﬁle of investment
in knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
31
0
5
10
15
20
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
20
40
60
80
st
oc
k 
of
 fi
na
nc
ia
l k
no
wl
ed
ge
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
ch
an
g 
in
 w
ea
lth
 (p
erc
en
t)
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
sh
ar
e 
so
ph
ist
ica
te
d
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
intervention at age 40, program cost of 250, relative marginal cost is .1
not enrolled enrolled enrolled − counterfactual
Figure 5: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: Inter-
vention at age 40 with # = 0:25 and  = 250. We plot the average age proﬁle of investment
in knowledge, stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth and the share of wealth invested
in sophisticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot
the age proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
32
0
10
20
30
40
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
kn
ow
le
dg
e
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
st
oc
k 
of
 fi
na
nc
ia
l k
no
wl
ed
ge
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
ch
an
g 
in
 w
ea
lth
 (p
erc
en
t)
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
sh
ar
e 
so
ph
ist
ica
te
d
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age
intervention at age 40, program cost of 100, relative marginal cost is .1
not enrolled enrolled enrolled − counterfactual
Figure 6: Eﬀects of the Financial Education Program over the Life-Cycle: In-
tervention at age 40 with # = 0:1 and  = 100 and no depreciation of knowledge among
participants to the program. We plot the average age proﬁle of investment in knowledge,
stock of knowledge, percent change in wealth, and the share of wealth invested in sophis-
ticated products by participation status. For those who participated, we also plot the age
proﬁle had they not participated in the program.
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age #  less HS HS college total
30 .5 500 .2349 .3302 .4453 .3662
40 .5 500 .3571 .4428 .5287 .4677
50 .5 500 .3438 .5109 .5792 .517
40 .25 500 .4048 .5084 .6169 .5405
40 .25 250 .4762 .6004 .6877 .6206
40 .1 100 .6131 .7899 .8429 .7882
Table 1: Program Participation: We report participation rates to the program among
those eligible for a series of scenarios and for three education levels. Age refers to the time at
which the program is implemented, # is the relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge
in the program, and  is the ﬁxed cost of participating in the program.
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age #  income (np) ﬁn (np) wealth (np) income (p) ﬁn (p) wealth (p)
30 .5 500 34182 2.577 18742 55559 12.67 52396
40 .5 500 39939 13.86 35747 69325 43.46 111863
50 .5 500 49104 36.79 143971 66180 61.48 189600
40 .25 500 36277 10.31 27705 68482 42.49 108452
40 .25 250 36171 10.04 29141 64388 38.5 97148
40 .1 100 32171 9.837 34501 59463 32.5 81246
Table 2: Characteristics of Participants and non participants: We report means of
baseline characteristics (income, ﬁnancial knowledge, and wealth) for participants (p) and
non participants (np). Age refers to the time at which the program is implemented, # is the
relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge in the program, and  is the ﬁxed cost of
participating in the program.
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age #  participants counterfactual non-participant non-eligible
30 .5 500 524271 522186 298979 392069
40 .5 500 519852 517146 253147 395314
50 .5 500 442676 440577 312325 394461
40 .25 500 515385 508452 220050 395314
40 .25 250 478872 472381 221023 395314
40 .1 100 467371 428874 187233 395314
Table 3: Wealth at Retirement by Groups: We report mean wealth at retirement (age
65) for those who participate in the program, mean wealth for those who participate had
they not participated (counterfactual), non participants among those eligible and ﬁnally
those not eligible. Age refers to the time at which the program is implemented, # is the
relative marginal cost of investing in knowledge in the program and  is the ﬁxed cost of
participating in the program.
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age #  ITT se
30 .5 500 .1141 .1129
40 .5 500 .1081 .1128
50 .5 500 -.02788 .113
40 .25 500 .1223 .1127
40 .25 250 .1236 .1127
40 .1 100 .2907 .1116
Table 4: Eﬀect of Oﬀering Financial Education Program on Wealth at Retirement
(Intent-to-Treat): We report for each program the intent-to-treat estimate of the program
along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by regressing log wealth at retirement
on eligibility to the program and controls for education and average lifetime income.
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age #  OLS se
30 .5 500 -.005068 .1512
40 .5 500 .4073 .1367
50 .5 500 .672 .13
40 .25 500 .5023 .1302
40 .25 250 .4428 .1241
40 .1 100 .7365 .1146
Table 5: Eﬀect of Financial Education Program Participation on Wealth at Re-
tirement (OLS): We report for each program the estimate of the eﬀect of the program
along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by regressing log wealth at retirement
on participation to the program and controls for education, average lifetime income and
initial wealth (at age 25).
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age #  LATE se
30 .5 500 .3102 .3069
40 .5 500 .2259 .235
50 .5 500 -.05387 .2183
40 .25 500 .2207 .2028
40 .25 250 .1964 .1786
40 .1 100 .3669 .1399
Table 6: Eﬀect of Financial Education Program Participation on Wealth at Re-
tirement (LATE-IV): We report for each program the estimate of the local average treat-
ment eﬀect along with standard error. This estimate is obtained by instrumental variables
regression of log wealth at retirement on participation to the program and controls for edu-
cation and average lifetime income. The instrumental variable is eligibility to the program.
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age #  counterfactual non-participant non-eligible
30 .5 500 -.01929 .7243 .4537
40 .5 500 .005797 .304 .1558
50 .5 500 .003612 -.01652 .009615
40 .25 500 .02136 .394 .1825
40 .25 250 .04464 .288 .1265
40 .1 100 .1142 .4037 .17
Table 7: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Eﬀect of Financial Education Program on
Wealth: We report estimates of the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial education program on wealth
(in percent) 5 years after the program, relative to one year prior to the program. This is
done using 3 potential counterfactuals. The ﬁrst uses outcomes of those treated had they
not participated (average eﬀect on the treated). The second and third columns use diﬀerent
counterfactuals. The second uses non participants (but eligible). The last column uses those
not eligible.
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Appendix
Parameter Value
ﬀ 1.6
 0.96
r 0.02
r(fmax) 0.04
0 50
1 1.75
cd 750
 0.06
cmin 10,000
Table A.1: Baseline Parameter Values. Baseline values are as follows: relative risk
aversion (ﬀ = 1:6), ﬁnancial knowledge depreciation rate ( = 0:06), investment production
function ((i) = 50i1:75), participation cost (cd = 750), discount factor ( = 0:96). The cost
of investing in knowledge takes the form (i) = 0i
1 . See text.
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